


Technology Security >>>


#### **Firewall**

TECHNOLOGY



## Firewall deployment

- Macomb
  - Campus ASA5540
  - ResNet ASA5540
  - Servers FWSM
- QCC
  - 60<sup>th</sup> St ASA5520
  - Caxton ASA5510
  - WQPT ASA5505
  - Arsenal ASA5505
    - Not installed yet
    - ETA: April 20, 2011





## Daily Firewall Counts

	Average per day
Macomb ASA & FWSM	11,401,986
QCC (60th St, WQPT, Caxton)	222,903
Total	11,624,889

We deny approximately 4.2 billion attempted connections per year.



Count	IP
31479	96.9.147.197
28130	60.173.26.55
26683	58.216.238.252
12939	221.1.220.185
9147	61.47.10.231
6845	211.214.160.120
6792	85.105.23.83
6513	174.90.21.156
5797	221.185.163.208
5399	66.151.128.210
5234	173.15.68.193
5021	12.188.0.190

Count	IP	Location	
31479	96.9.147.197	Pennsylvania, USA	
28130	60.173.26.55	China	
26683	58.216.238.252	China	
12939	221.1.220.185	China	
9147	61.47.10.231	Thailand	
6845	211.214.160.120	Republic of Korea	à
6792	85.105.23.83	Turkey	
6513	174.90.21.156	Canada	
5797	221.185.163.208	Japan	V.
5399	66.151.128.210	California, USA	
5234	173.15.68.193	Comcast, USA	
5021	12.188.0.190	Macomb, IL	

Count	IP	Location		Protocol/port
31479	96.9.147.197	Pennsylvania, USA	4	tcp/2967 (ssc-agent)
28130	60.173.26.55	China	11	tcp/3306 (my-sql)
26683	58.216.238.252	China	11	tcp/27977
12939	221.1.220.185	China	11	tcp/1022 (exp2)
9147	61.47.10.231	Thailand		tcp/445 (mircrosoft-ds)
6845	211.214.160.120	Republic of Korea	•	tcp/445 (mircrosoft-ds)
6792	85.105.23.83	Turkey	Ć.	tcp/445 (mircrosoft-ds)
6513	174.90.21.156	Canada	10	tcp/445 (mircrosoft-ds)
5797	221.185.163.208	Japan	•	tcp/445 (mircrosoft-ds)
5399	66.151.128.210	California, USA	4	icmp (ping)
5234	173.15.68.193	Comcast, USA	4	udp/53 (DNS)
5021	12.188.0.190	Macomb, IL	$L_{\pm}$	udp/53 (DNS)

Count	IP	Location	used by
31479	96.9.147.197	Pennsylvania, USA	databases
28130	60.173.26.55	China	/3306 (n.s-sql)
26683	58.216.238.25	Microsoft	/27977
12939	221.1.220.	SMB ports	/1022 (exp2)
9147	61.47.10.2	used for file	/445 (mircrosoft-ds)
6845	211.214.160.120	sharing	445 (mircrosoft-ds)
6792	85.105.23.83	Turkey	445 (mircrosoft-ds)
6513	174.90.21.156	Canada	145 (mircrosoft-ds)
5797	221.185.163.208	Japan	(445 (mircrosoft-ds)
5399	66.151.128.210	California, USA	p (ping)
5234	173.15.68.193	Comcast, USA	/53 (DNS)
5021	12.188.0.190	Macomb, IL	/53 (DNS)


Count	IP
100203	143.43.179.15
88494	143.43.186.135
63998	143.43.184.245
22358	143.43.213.114
20180	143.43.142.11
19106	143.43.178.150
18458	143.43.156.122
17384	143.43.189.2
16545	143.43.191.157
15723	143.43.188.182
14375	143.43.190.131
13074	143.43.188.241

Count	IP	Location
100203	143.43.179.15	Non-secure Wireless
88494	143.43.186.135	Non-secure Wireless
63998	143.43.184.245	Non-secure Wireless
22358	143.43.213.114	Brophy
20180	143.43.142.11	DNS server
19106	143.43.178.150	Non-secure Wireless
18458	143.43.156.122	Not used
17384	143.43.189.2	Non-secure Wireless
16545	143.43.191.157	Non-secure Wireless
15723	143.43.188.182	Non-secure Wireless
14375	143.43.190.131	Non-secure Wireless
13074	143.43.188.241	Non-secure Wireless

Count	IP	Location	Protocol/port
100203	143.43.179.15	Non-secure Wireless	misc protocols (tcp, udp, icmp)
88494	143.43.186.135	Non-secure Wireless	icmp
63998	143.43.184.245	Non-secure Wireless	udp/22864
22358	143.43.213.114	Brophy	udp/8889
20180	143.43.142.11	DNS server	icmp, udp/53 (DNS)
19106	143.43.178.150	Non-secure Wireless	misc protocols (tcp, udp, icmp)
18458	143.43.156.122	Not used	misc udp ports
17384	143.43.189.2	Non-secure Wireless	udp/24844
16545	143.43.191.157	Non-secure Wireless	misc protocols (tcp, udp, icmp)
15723	143.43.188.182	Non-secure Wireless	udp/40089 tcp/40089
14375	143.43.190.131	Non-secure Wireless	udp/37981
13074	143.43.188.241	Non-secure Wireless	udp/55381


Count	-0	Location	Protocol/port
100203	Peer-2-I		misc protocols (tcp, udp, icmp)
88494	145. Activit	y ure Wireless	icmp
63998	143.43.184.245	on-secure Wireless	udo/22864
22358	143.43.213.114	Bro, by	udp/8889
20180	143.43.142.11	DNS server	icmp, udp/53 (DNS)
19106	143.43.178.150	Non-secure Wireless	mist protocols (tcp, udp, icmp)
18458	143.43.156.122	Not used	misc udp ports
17384	143.43.189.2	Non-secure Wireless	un: /24844
16545	143.43.191.157	Non-secure Wireless	rrice protocols (tcp, udp, icmp)
15723	143.43.188.182	Non-secure Wireless	udp, 40089 tcp/40089
14375	143.43.190.131	Non-secure Wireless	udz, 37981
13074	143.43.188.241	Non-secure Wireless	udp/55381

## Intrusion Detection System(IDS)



TECHNOLOGY

#### Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)





#### IDS/IPS types

- Signature
  - Uses list of signatures to detect bad traffic, similar to Anti-Virus software
  - Pros
    - Proven technology
    - Very few false positives
  - Cons
    - Only as good as signatures
    - Cannot detect 0-day

- Statistical anomaly (Heuristics)
  - Notices changes in network behavior
  - Pros
    - Can detect 0 day
  - Cons
    - Newer technology
    - Large database
    - Does not work well when traffic changes



## IDS/IPS used at WIU

- Cisco SSM
  - Signature based IPS
  - Installed inside the Cisco ASA's, sees all Internet traffic
    - Macomb Campus
    - QC 60<sup>th</sup> St
    - QC WQPT
    - QC Caxton

- Stealth Watch
  - Heuristics based IDS
  - Monitors all of Macomb campuses network core traffic, sees all Internet and Server traffic



#### Daily IPS Alerts Denied - Cisco SSM

	Total Alerts	Denied Alerts
All alerts	268,158	159,609
High alerts	2,195	1,999

We deny approximately 729 thousand high level attacks a year.



## Quality of Service (QOS)

- Used to control bandwidth
- Reserves bandwidth for mission critical services
- Makes sure that all other devices get an equal amount of bandwidth
- Packeteer
  - Macomb campus
  - QC 60<sup>th</sup> St campus



## Packeteer Implementation

- Peer-2-peer
  - All P2P is limited to 2MB container.
- Exceptions
  - All mission critical services are placed in this.
     partition, i.e. Zimbra, western online, web servers...
  - This allows these services to have some bandwidth reserved.
- Dynamic Partitions
  - Default container.
  - Automatically adjust bandwidth so all users get a fair amount.




## Packeteer - Dynamic Partitions

- Macomb 2Mbps
- ResNet 1 Mbps
- ▶ QC-60<sup>th</sup> St. 3Mbps



## Packeteer - Macomb Campus



#### Virtual Private Network (VPN)

- Used to allow secure access to our trusted intranet from the un-trusted Internet
- Macomb
  - Two Cisco ASA-5520's for redundancy
  - QCC The main firewall is also doing VPN
- We implement our VPN in three different classifications
  - Site to site
  - Vendors
  - Clients




#### VPN - Site to Site


- 3 VPN's from Macomb campus to QC 60<sup>th</sup> St, QC Caxton and QC WQPT
- 2 VPN's from QC 60<sup>th</sup> St to QC Caxton and QC WQPT
- Central Management Services (CMS) to Springfield, IL
- Disaster recovery
- Portal Tunnel
- Beu to CTI



#### Macomb to QCC VPN Traffic -Inbound



#### Macomb to QCC VPN Traffic -Outbound



#### **VPN** – Vendors

- Macomb campus 21 vendor VPN's
  - Laserfiche access for Business Services
  - DVSport access for Athletics
  - Nuclear Motion access for Physics
  - LockSmith access for Physical Plant
  - H2IT access to VoIP systems
  - Right Answers access to Western Knowledge Base
- QC 60<sup>th</sup> St 1 vendor VPN
- QC WQPT 1 vendor VPN



#### VPN - Client

- Cisco AnyConnect Client
  - Does support 64bit OS's
  - Uses SSL for encryption
  - Is set up from a web page <a href="https://vpn.wiu.edu">https://vpn.wiu.edu</a>
  - Is the replacement for the Cisco VPN Client
- Cisco VPN Client
  - Does not support 64bit Windows system
  - Uses IPSec for encryption
  - Is obsolete (will be discontinued this summer)
  - Currently users of this client are sent an email to ask them to start using the AnyConnect Client



# Authentication, Authorization, Accounting (AAA)

- Authentication
  - Who is allowed access
- Authorization
  - What they are allowed access to
- Accounting
  - What did they access




#### Cisco ACS

- VPN
  - 18 passed authentication per day
- Secure Wireless
  - 2052 passed authentication per day
  - 125 unique users per day
- Currently researching how to better manage
   Authorization and Accounting



#### Cisco ACS



#### **Antivirus**

- ▶ SEP11
  - New console was brought online by User Support.
  - Monitor console.



#### SEP11 Console




#### Malware Procedure

- 1. Computer is scanned for sensitive data
- 2. If Sensitive data is found
  - 1. Sensitive data is removed from computer
  - 2. Computer is imaged
- 3. Malware is removed
- Computer is returned to user in operating condition
- 5. Risk assessment is done




## Malware

	Fall 2009	Spring 2010	Fall 2010
Macomb	150	220	921
QC	9	10	15
Total	159	230	936



#### Malware

	Fall 2009	Spring 2010	Fall 2010
Macomb	150	220	921
QC	9	10	15
Total	159	230	936




#### **Protecting Computers**

- Published monthly Windows patching cycle
- Symantec upgrade to SEP 11.06
- Disabled auto-run
- User Access Control
  - User accounts that are members of the local Administrators group will run most applications as a standard user
  - Most tasks requiring administrative rights will autoelevate



## SEP11 Console




# **Vulnerability Scans**

- All vulnerability scans are conducted with Nessus
- Quarterly vulnerability scans are done on all servers
- Ad-hoc scans are done when a server is requested external firewall changes
- The 2011 Quarter 1 Vulnerability Report is a 39 page document




# Qtr. 1, 2011 Results


	Device Count	% of Devices	Total Vuln.
High Level Vulnerabilities	69	17%	136
Medium Level Vulnerabilities	185	45%	1,415
Low Level Vulnerabilities	155	37%	10,255



# Vulnerability Scan History




# High Vulnerability by Group






## Qtr. 1, 2011 Lockdown





# Lockdown by Group





# Copyright Notice Procedure

#### ResNet

- Trace IP in the notice to the room occupants
- The notice is then forwarded on to the occupants of the room

#### Wireless

 Since we cannot trace on our wireless network, all wireless notices are discarded

#### Campus

- Trace IP in the notice to the computer
- Notify the user and their supervisor of the infringement



## Copyright Notices Received From


- BayTSP
- Business Software Alliance (BSA)
- CBS Corporation
- Columbia Pictures Industries Inc.
- ▶ Home Box Office, Inc. (HBO)
- Lionsgate Films
- Lucas Arts
- Media Factory
- Media Sentry
- NBC Universal
- Paramount Pictures Corporation

- Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
- Sony Pictures Entertainment
- Universal Studios
- Video Protection Alliance Services (VPA)
- Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.
- Worldwide Sony Pictures Entertainment Acquisitions Inc.
- Zuffa LLC



## Notices to Date

	Fall 2008	Spring 2009	Fall 2009	Spring 2010	Fall 2010	Total
Macomb	130	246	206	250	423	963
QC	0	0	0	0	0	0



# Identity Protection Act (Public Act 096–0874) Efforts

- A Credit Card handling policy and an updated SSN policy approved by the President's cabinet in August 2010
- Annual Credit Card handling training in place since 2008
- Regular sensitive data handling training in place since January 2011



### Sensitive Data Scans

- Sensitive data scans started Fall 2009
- Seek-N-Secure (SNS) is the application used for scans
  - Automatically installed on all Windows computers using AD
  - Manually installed on all Macintosh computers
  - Currently being installed and tested on servers




## Sensitive Data Scans Procedure

- All Windows computers are scanned semiannually, except labs
  - This is limited to Windows based computers for now
- All computers with Malware are scanned
- All computers with data transfers are scanned before data is transferred
- Server scans are starting in the summer of 2011




## % Computers with Data on Semi-Annual Scans



## Semi-Annual Scan Results


Semester	Files Scanned.	CC	SSN
Fall 2009	2,192,062	6,951	909,113
Spring 2010	144,440,332	43,403	1,534,979
Fall 2010	117,190,775	13,997	1,977,313
Total	283,557,149	64,351	4,421,405

#### **Total Sensitive Data Found**



## In Scope WIU Computers

(currently only Windows)




## Where Have All The WIU Computers Gone?

(Based on Property Accounting Data)

- Purchase of Approximately 4,050
   Computers Preceded the University SSN Policy
  - 2007 Through 3/28/07 106 computers (Original SSN Policy Approved 3/30/07)
  - ∘ 2006 − 1,009 computers (4 years old or older)
  - 2000–2005 2,806 computers
  - 1990s 124 computers
  - 1980s 5 computers (including 1 from 1985)






- ▶ With 72% of Windows computers scanned
  - ▶ 42% of computers contain sensitive data
  - 3 cents per record cleaned vs. \$204 on average per record to notify

### "The truth will set you free. But first, it will piss you off" – Gloria Steinem

	Number of		
Year	Incidents	Records	
2006	1	180,000	
2008	1	108	
2009	4	681	
2010	4	158	



- 10 incidents since July 2006 have required WIU to notify nearly 181,000 individuals and the Illinois General Assembly of possible data leaks
- Additionally Western experienced 2 FERPA data leaks in 2010

#### With support from ESS cleaned 279 computers in the Division of Student Services in 6 weeks

- Vice President Student Services
- Financial Aid
- Brooks Cultural Center
- Casa Latina
- Womens Center
- Career Services
- Counseling Center
- Disability Support Services
- Veteran Center
- Student Legal, Student Judicial, Student Development
- Student Activities, Student Government, Student Organization Center, Student Assistance & Parent Service Center
- Union Admin offices & Union Service Center



## Disaster Recovery

- Together with AIMS and Financial Aid successfully tested the recovery of the Financial Aid Interface System from the SunGard facility in Chicago
- Off Site Storage for uTech (Systems, Enterprise Systems, Telecom) and ESS Moved to QC




# Technology Security

FY12 Priorities

## Identity Protection Act Efforts

- Plan Survey SSN Usage and Hire DBA (or make extensive use of consultants)
- Do
  - Risk Assessments
    - VP Approved Justification for Sensitive Data
    - VP Approved Plans to Protect Data in Transit and at Rest
  - FTP, Email, Databases, Mainframe
- Check Audit
- Act Improve





"If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don't understand the problems and you don't understand the technology." — Bruce Schneier

# Identity Protection Act (Public Act 096–0874) Efforts – Cont

- SnS Scanning for SSN and Credit Card Data
  - Ongoing scanning March/April and October/Nov
  - Extend scanning to Macs including Macs running Windows using Bootcamp or within a virtual environment
  - Extend Scanning to Windows, Mac, Solaris, and Linux Servers
  - Extend Scanning to Email Archives
  - Extend Divisional scanning beyond the Division of Student Services



## Secure Wireless

- Security Model Proposed Spring 2008
  - +New secure wireless network coexists with current open wireless network
  - +PCI DSS specific secure wireless network created for areas that must take cards over wireless
  - +Open wireless network modified to only allow limited Internet access
- \* Next Step Xpress Connect and communications plan



# What Can We Learn From Spyrat?

- 725 infected university computers including 2
   Servers
- 335 non lab computers SnS scanned
  - 23 computers had 478 CCs and 5,247 SSNs
  - 30% never scanned




## Never Been SnS Scanned

 Extend Divisional scanning beyond the Division of Student Services

▶ The Need for Open Directory LDAP/AD

Integration




# What Can We Learn From Spyrat?

- 725 infected university computers including 2 Servers
- 335 non lab computers SnS scanned
  - 23 computers had 478 CCs and 5,247 SSNs
  - 30% never scanned
  - 57% had data in temp internet files or Recycle Bin



Managing Internet Files & Recycle Bins (opt-in to or opt-out of University provided protection)




### Symantec SEP Vendor Recommendations

- Evaluate the Symantec firewall for possible replacement of the built-in OS firewall
- Move away from using an internal SEP console database




## Server High Vulnerability by Group






# Server Vulnerability Scanning





# Server Lockdowns by Group





# Server Security Project (Focus on Risk)

- Baseline AV/Patching
- Extend SnS Scanning to Windows, Mac, UNIX, and Linux Servers
- Resolve Critical/High Vulnerabilities
- Complete Server Lockdowns
  - Submit forms to admin office
- Server Business Continuity
- Administrative Password Policy Compliance



## Disaster Recovery

- Together with AIMS test recovery of the Automated Payments System from the SunGard facility in Chicago on June 7th.
- Extend DR/BC testing to Servers, Network, VOIP, and QC



# Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standards (DSS) Compliance

- Status of PCI compliance as presented to Presidents Cabinet in 2010
  - **×**55+ University Merchants IDs
  - ★Over half are considered complex merchants requiring compliance with all 220+ requirements in DSS 2.0
  - \*Funding Model Northern Illinois University and University of Illinois model
  - \*Biggest need is the hire the services of a PCI approved Qualified Security Assessor
- \* Update: Bank of America & Citizens bank have asked for proof of compliance. Global Payments has implied that they will do the same



## Use of QSAs in Illinois Higher Education

- Trustwave
  - Northern Illinois University
  - University of Illinois
  - Illinois State University
- Coal Fire
  - State of Illinois Treasurer's Office



# Hire DBA (or make extensive use of consultants)

Illinois universities such as University of Illinois, SIUC, Illinois State and EIU average 4 Information Security FTEs. At WIU Technology Security covers security, policy, awareness, compliance, DR, privacy and DMCA warnings with a CTSO and about 70% of a Technology Security Specialist.



# Questions?



