Damming Hetch Hetchy

Environmental Preservation Versus Urban Development

Hist 422(G)

    

12/6/2007

 

 

 

 


 

 

"I recognize the right and duty of this generation to develop and use our natural resources, but I do not recognize the right to waste them, or to rob by wasteful use, the generations that come after us." - Theodore Roosevelt, speech, Washington, D.C., 1900

 

The Hetch Hetchy Valley lies nearly 159 miles east of the San Francisco Bay Area in the heart of a rugged territory in northern California.  It has been said to parallel Yosemite National Park in both composition and beauty; a paradise for those seeking the refuge and peace only nature can offer.[1]  Yet Yosemite has been deemed one of our nation’s greatest natural treasures while the Hetch Hetchy Valley is largely remembered for a fight that occurred over water rights nearly a century ago.  The local result was the damming of the valley and the creation of a stable water supply for the city of San Francisco.  However, the valley became the centerpiece for “a larger conflict between beauty and materialism, sentiment and the utilitarian viewpoint.”[2]  A ferocious conflict erupted between those who wanted to protect the valley and those who wanted to exploit it.  Americans were forced to examine for the first time the fine balance between a conservation ethic of capitalistic development and the pure preservation of the country’s natural assets for the enjoyment of future generations. 

 

A Pristine Valley

            At the time of its discovery by the first American settlers in California, the Hetch Hetchy Valley was equal in magnitude and grandeur to its southern neighbor, Yosemite.  Hetch Hetchy mirrored most of Yosemite’s trademark features, some of which were arguably even more impressive in the northern valley.  The valley boasted a striking counterpart to the famed El Capitan monolith.  This twin monolith rose 1800 feet to the sky.  Over its edge rushed a great flow of water, which fell “perfectly free in the air for a thousand feet.”[3]  The waterfall, dubbed Tueeulala, exceeded even Yosemite’s more well-known Bridal Veil “both in height and airy-fairy beauty and behavior.”[4]  Tueeulala cascaded over the precipice of the monolith “without a trace of disorder-air, water and sunlight woven into stuff that spirits might wear.”[5]  The Hetch Hetchy Valley was cordoned off by enormous “sublime rocks… [that] seem to glow with life.”[6]  Within the Valley’s rocky walls were magnificent groves of golden cup oaks whose rugged trunks reached eternally skyward.[7] 

            Due to the unparalleled beauty and unique formations in both valleys, Yosemite and Hetch Hetchy were designated as a national park in 1890 by an act of Congress.[8]  The recognition as a national park would serve to preserve the area’s scenery and the natural beauty of the mountains for the entire country’s recreational use.[9]  It would also protect the park from the destructive force of grazing herds of sheep, which were viewed by conservationists as “hoofed locusts.”   The waters of the region would also be conserved for irrigational purposes in the San Joaquin Valley.[10]

 

Explosive Growth

As settlers flocked to California during the Gold Rush era, the Hetch Hetchy Valley gained a new, urban neighbor to its west.  San Francisco experienced a population boom in 1849 with the discovery of gold.  The city saw massive development in a short time frame.  From 1860 to 1910, its population grew by 811,634 citizens; a gain of over 160,000 people every decade.[11]  Its rapid growth often led to shoddy construction which fueled a multitude of fires.  San Francisco would burn down and be completely rebuilt seven times between the years 1849 and 1851.[12]  This hasty expansion created an increased need for both drinking water and a public water supply that could keep up with the demands and hazards of urban development.  A clean and stable supply of water was an essential element for urban growth.  In 1848 the only available water supplies were crude, hand dug wells and water boats that came from across the Bay.[13]  No significant river or flowing water source actually lay within easy traveling distance of the city itself and street vendors made a very good profit.    

Seeking to create a reliable infrastructure to obviate the need of the water merchants, San Francisco began negotiating with a variety of water companies in the mid 1800’s.  Mountain Lake Water Company was the first to contract with the young metropolis in 1851 but never actually delivered any water due to going bankrupt.  In 1857 the San Francisco Water Works company was formed.  They were the first to actually bring water into the city via a flume from Lobos Creek.  Spring Valley Water Works was founded in 1858 by George Ensign, who developed a natural spring within the city itself for commercial water production.  Both companies were later bought out and eventually consolidated in 1865, the company renaming itself in 1904 the Spring Valley Water Company.  Also during this time the city began exploring alternative sources of water including artesian wells, piping water from across the bay in Alameda County, and going outward in search of water which could be more easily accessed.  In this search, San Francisco turned its eyes toward the abundant snowmelt of the Sierras.[14]

 

The Bay Area Needs Water and the Spring Valley Water Company is Happy to Reply

            By 1913, San Francisco was consuming 40 million gallons of water per day.[15]  The water being pumped from Alameda County lowered the water table by 30 feet.  The drop in the water table spurred fears that the neighboring county would bring litigation against San Francisco over the dwindling water reserve.  Alameda County would certainly eventually refuse to allow any more water to be piped to San Francisco.  As water became less available both counties could see disastrous effects to local agriculture.[16]  The Bay Area quickly began “suffering from water famine…about one third of the city [was] without water connection” as was noted by Congress in 1913.[17]  The city was paying higher water rates than any other city of its size in the world.[18]

As the water crisis intensified, the Spring Valley Water Company saw a unique opportunity for business.  Spring Valley Water aggressively pursued the formation of a monopoly by purchasing nearby water sources and by launching hostile takeovers of rival water suppliers.[19]  Thanks to a legal loophole, Spring Valley was exempted from providing free water for municipal use.  In 1869, the company placed meters on municipal spigots; the city would now have to pay for water in parks and public buildings.  The city was afforded free water for fire-fighting but nothing else.[20]  The new constraints placed upon the ready availability and affordability of water led to 11 years of litigation between the city and the Spring Valley Water Company.  The monopoly triumphed in the majority of cases.  It also resulted in endless complaints of poor service from customers around the Bay Area.[21]

 

Why Hetch Hetchy?

            As frustrations over a lack of water and the fight with the Spring Valley Water Company grew, San Francisco became increasingly desperate for a new water supply.  In 1913, the Army board reported that practically all available water in California would be used for irrigation or hydro-electric power.  According to the board, it would be possible “to obtain water for municipal use only at great cost and damage to existing industries.”[22]  Snowmelt from the nearby Sierra Nevadans quickly seemed like a natural source of water, which would provide a cheap and stable supply enduring well into the future.  However, San Francisco did not limit itself in its explorations and considered several different sources as first presented by General George H. Mendell’s 1877 report.[23]

            The report offered four primary water sources that could be viable for the city of San Francisco’s use with the conspicuous absence of the Hetch Hetchy Valley.  The first, the Mokelumne River, was discarded as it was believed to have an inadequate supply.  The Sacramento River was another feasible option, but it was already undergoing significant usage by irrigation interests.[24]  In northern California, the McCloud River offered a larger water supply than Hetch Hetchy but would cost $20-50 million more to develop and it was a poor site for future power generation.[25]  Lake Tahoe was viewed as a particularly contentious site since water there was already being divided between California and Nevada.  The state of Nevada would almost certainly begin legal proceedings if any attempt was made by San Francisco to lower the level of the lake through water usage.[26]  San Francisco rapidly came to the conclusion that the Hetch Hetchy Valley would be the best option for development.

The Hetch Hetchy Valley would be an ideal site for a dam.  The mouth of the valley had a small width which would facilitate construction.  The resulting reservoir would “transform a barren canyon into a beautiful and exquisite lake.”[27]  Damming the valley would maximize the use of snowmelt water that had previously run off into the Pacific Ocean with all of its potential being “wasted.”[28]  In addition, the run-off from the snowmelt caused devastating floods in the San Joaquin Valley every spring.  The dam would allow neighboring communities to efficiently use flood water without draining the natural flow of the stream.  It also prevented future flooding and reduced the need for aid in flooded areas.[29]  San Francisco realized the monetary gains that could be made from a power plant that would originate with a dam in Hetch Hetchy as well.  More water power could be acquired from this dam than any other project.[30]

            With its new designs, San Francisco quickly moved to buy out private interests that owned portions of the valley.  Even though Hetch Hetchy had gained status as a national park, the prior ownership of private interests was still recognized.  This enabled the city to purchase large tracts of land within the park’s boundaries and to establish a certain degree of leverage over how the land could be used.  San Francisco soon owned portions of both Hetch Hetchy and Yosemite while the federal government held possession of the remainder of the park.  The city would need total control of Hetch Hetchy to act upon any plans for building a dam or reservoir.  San Francisco seized upon an opportunity to take control of the remainder of Hetch Hetchy by offering to relinquish its holdings in Yosemite to the federal government at no cost.[31] 

            As the federal government considered San Francisco’s offer and desire toward development, it began contemplating several factors.  Central to this was the fact that the park was remote and rugged.  To that point, no one visited it.  Only the rich could gain access to its interior.  If roads and infrastructure could be developed, the park could be open to every level of the public.[32]  The government could place an obligation upon San Francisco to build and maintain roads in the park.[33]  With the city’s avid encouragement and led by such men as the former mayor James Phelan and the City Engineer Marsden Manson, the federal government began to sway in favor of a dam.  Phelan had always had an ambition that San Francisco would emerge as an “imperial city” and come to dominate all other cities in the region.  With a strong and secure water supply, this would guarantee virtually unchecked growth and economic prosperity into the foreseeable future.

 

Outcry and Opposition

            San Francisco’s interest in the Hetch Hetchy Valley and the federal government’s exploration of the city’s proposal sparked a nationwide discussion over development versus the preservation of national parks.  The American public began weighing the possible consequences of the dangerous precedent that threatened to be set.   Could the future integrity of the nation’s parks be compromised when corporations and developers found money-making opportunities within their boundaries?  Should the valley be granted to San Francisco without just cause?  Many argued that San Francisco should be required to prove beyond doubt the necessity of the dam before the nation should be forced to surrender its park under circumstances “involving such far-reaching consequences.”[34]

            Two of the most outspoken challengers of the development of the Hetch Hetchy Valley were John Muir, the renowned conservationist and nature writer, and his friend Robert Underwood Johnson.  R.U. Johnson was an associate editor for Century Magazine, an influential publication of the time.  Johnson composed countless editorials concerning the need to preserve the nation’s parks with an emphasis on the Hetch Hetchy Valley.  Johnson’s contempt for developers was clear in his written statement for the Congressional record on the matter of Hetch Hetchy.  He boldly noted to Congress that Hetch Hetchy was a “veritable temple of the living god and again the money changers are in the temple.”[35]  Johnson went on to state that “the importance of reasons for dismembering your park must be equal to the importance of the reasons for its creation and the reasons for dismembering it must not be accepted as final when they come from the party in interest.”[36]  The editor warned that all other national parks could fall prey to corporations or public interests should a precedent be set in the Hetch Hetchy Valley.[37]

Johnson ridiculed the city of San Francisco for its pretense of investigating every viable water option.  While the city issued a $45 million bond to thoroughly examine solutions to its water problem, it became clear that only two possible resources were truly scrutinized; the primary one being Hetch Hetchy.  An inadequate study was done for all other possible water supplies.[38]  With $45 million to pour into research and a hefty report, the Hetch Hetchy Valley was quickly painted as a very attractive site for development.  Johnson urged Congress to commission an impartial and complete investigation of all other water sources.[39]

John Muir added his disdain for development of the Hetch Hetchy Valley.  Muir maintained that better, cleaner water could be found elsewhere.  This refuted claims made by developers that Hetch Hetchy would yield the purest water.  Muir stated that the water in the valley was “less pure than that of most of the other Sierra streams, because of the sewage of camp-grounds draining into it, especially of the Big Tuolumne Meadows camp ground.”[40]  In addition to challenging arguments posed by those in favor of the dam, Muir worried over the destruction of the valley and the loss of a natural treasure.  Muir lamented the idea of submerging the valley for the creation of a reservoir and cautioned “not only would [the valley] be utterly destroyed but the sublime canyon way to the heart of the high sierra would be hopelessly blocked and the great camping ground…would be closed to the public” forever.[41] The preservationists stated that numerous alternative water sites were available that were not within the public park system such as at Lake Eleanor, Cherry Creek, the Poopenaut Valley, the Sacramento River and the Stanislaus river system.  These other sites could provide just as much water and would also not negatively impact anyone’s rights or the domain of nature.

Johnson and Muir, along with the Sierra Club, began a massive writing campaign against the development proposal.  Pamphlets, brochures and newspaper articles began appearing across the country in an attempt to edify the populace and begin a grassroots movement against the development of the park.  They strongly advocated the position that the park belonged to all of the American people and not just San Francisco.  By trying to appeal to conservationist lines of thought the Sierra Club even endorsed building a road into the park to improve access for people to visit it, thus getting the best use for the most people.

Muir and Johnson weren’t the only advocates of finding an alternative water source that did not involve Hetch Hetchy.  A number of journalists spoke out against developing a national park in newspaper columns across the nation.  Many pointed out the inaccurate notions presented by San Francisco’s city government.  When San Francisco argued that no one even visited the park, Harriet Monroe countered that a railroad line to reach the park had only been established two years earlier.  Before that tourists were confined to solely the Yosemite Valley, but surely as progress crept westward more visitors would be arriving at Hetch Hetchy.[42]  Another editorial in the New York Times was skeptical of the San Francisco’s claim that a new water source was required so that the city could be freed from the Spring Valley monopoly.  The Times writer noted that water prices were fixed by the courts, not Spring Valley, so in effect the city was not being kept in a strangle-hold by a private corporation at all.[43]

Other members of the opposition were less altruistic in their motivations.  The Sierra Blue Lakes and Water Power Company owned the water rights for the Mokelumne River elsewhere in the Sierras.  Sierra Blue Lakes, seeing an opportunity for a large sale, offered rights to sites along the Mokelumne and posed several possible advantages.  Developing their site would avoid the controversial invasion of a national park.  It would save the effort of having to tunnel through 70 miles of solid rock and would shorten the route by 65 miles.  The plan offered by Sierra Blue Lakes would also drastically shorten the amount of time required to develop a working water system from the estimated 10 years it would take to dam Hetch Hetchy to a mere 4 years.  Sierra Blue Lakes even offered to settle upon an arbitrated price for the land rather than negotiating directly with San Francisco.[44]

Neighboring irrigation districts with prior claims to water from Hetch Hetchy also opposed the plan to dam the Tuolumne River.  The Turlock and Modesto districts were already granted 2,350 second/feet of the normal flow of water through Lake Eleanor and the Hetch Hetchy Valley under California state law.  Both districts feared that San Francisco would appropriate the claim of all water in the river once a dam was constructed.  Irrigation systems in Turlock and Modesto would be threatened.[45]

Even the lambasted Spring Valley Water Company derided the development of the Hetch Hetchy Valley.  Since Spring Valley already held a complete monopoly over San Francisco’s current water supply, the company was not eager for a new competing interest to arrive on the scene.  Spring Valley spoke out against development in attempt to further secure its own corporate status in a growing metropolis.

Finally, members of the Congress were skeptical of the plan to develop Hetch Hetchy.  Many were highly concerned over the precedent that would be set involving the dismemberment of national parks and the loss of a public recreational treasure.  The fact that Hetch Hetchy or any other park was not accessible or highly visited at that point in time was not a valid or permissible reason “for destroying them.  But that might be a very good reason for providing accessibility to them,” according to Illinois Congressman James Mann.[46] It was their belief that the parks should be preserved for the future.

Some members even felt that states’ rights would be infringed upon.  In order for the federal government to agree with plans to develop the park, it would need guarantees from California that previous irrigation rights held by Turlock and Modesto would be honored.  Congress feared this would create a conflict over states’ rights as the federal government would be dictating to California how it should be using its own water supply.  This fear was not shared by the state of California which held no reservations over the construction of a dam.[47] 

 

Stepping Stones on the Path to a Dam

            Congress was not initially inclined to support the idea of erecting a dam inside national park territory.  San Francisco would have an uphill battle if it were to proceed with their grand scheme.  Several events that occurred at both the national and local levels helped the city along the way.  In 1901, Congress passed the Right-of-Way Act.  This act charged the Secretary of the Interior with the ability to permit development of the nation’s parks.[48]  The same year, San Francisco’s city engineer, C.E. Grunsky, was commissioned to survey twelve possible water sources and was allotted $50,000 for doing so.[49]  The report selected Hetch Hetchy as the best alternative source of water for the city.  Upon the release of Grunsky’s report, Mayor James Duval Phelan took advantage of a loophole in state law and applied for an individual permit seeking water rights in Hetch Hetchy.  Under state law, the city was unable to file such a permit.  Phelan bypassed this issue by filing for himself and perfecting the permit.  Once the permit was approved, the mayor planned to simply transfer all water rights to the city.[50]

              Much to Mayor Phelan’s dismay, the Secretary of the Interior, Ethan Hitchcock, denied the initial permit and two following ones.  Each permit was rejected on the grounds that the Secretary’s office did not have the power to allow such right-of-way within Yosemite despite the earlier passing of the Right-of-Way Act by Congress.[51]  After rejecting the third permit in February 1905, Hitchcock announced no grant would be made without further legislation by Congress.[52]  On October 28, 1905, the Attorney General of the U.S. determined that the Secretary of the Interior did in fact have the authority to allow right-of-way through the park, but it was a matter of administrative judgment as to whether the permit should be granted.  Secretary Hitchcock acted on his belief that developing the park was not in the nation’s best interest and that it should instead be preserved in its natural state.[53]  

 

Disaster in 1906

            It seemed that the city of San Francisco was at an impasse.  While the federal government had made some movement toward freeing water rights in the park, individual legislators were not cooperating.  At 5:12 am on April 18, 1906, a severe earthquake rocked the Bay area.  Within minutes, fifty fires exploded from broken wiring and fuses, and overturned stoves and lamps and would burn for three days.[54]  By the end of the ordeal, 28,000 buildings had burned to the ground.  Seven hundred citizens were killed and 4.7 square miles at the heart of the city had been razed.  Nearly 225,000 of the city’s 400,000 residents were homeless.  Before long, city officials were looking for an explanation as to what went wrong.  The fire department was quick to remark that the Spring Valley Water Company had failed to respond with adequate amounts of water to halt the fire.  Spring Valley had long blocked the construction of additional water mains which could have facilitated fire fighting endeavors.[55]  Had the city possessed a better means of obtaining water, the fires might not have raged for three days and countless lives and property could have been saved.  The nation rallied behind the city of San Francisco.  Suddenly sympathy for San Francisco’s water fight abounded.  With the devastation and new tragedy pointing directly to water issues, San Francisco renewed its efforts toward its designs on Hetch Hetchy.

 

Measurable Progress for San Francisco

San Francisco made new inroads toward the proposed dam with a sequence of new secretaries of the interior, the first being James Garfield.  Garfield granted a revocable permit authorizing the use of Lake Eleanor and Cherry Creek, both outside the national park’s domain.[56]  This would give San Francisco a starting point for development, which would not yet endanger the park.  Secretary Garfield did not allege that the Hetch Hetchy Valley was the best or only available water source.  He did concede it was one of many desirable locations and bolstered the city’s hopes by stating “the greatest good to the greatest number justifies alienating the park for the benefit of the citizens of San Francisco.”[57]  If Hetch Hetchy were truly unique, not just a twin of the southern Yosemite Valley, the need for its exact preservation would be greater.  Instead, Garfield took a progressive approach toward conservation by supporting the best use of the land over leaving it untouched.[58]

Along with Garfield, President Theodore Roosevelt and Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot both supported the best use conservation ethic for land use.  Although Roosevelt was a preservationist at heart, he was also a political realist and a determined promoter of economic development.  Roosevelt, along with Pinchot, sought to create a compromise between the preservationists of the Sierra Club and the conservationist developers.  Between them, they came up with a 50 year plan in which San Francisco would first develop the water capabilities of Lake Eleanor and Cherry Creek, as well as the Poopenaut Valley.  It was estimated that this would provide enough water for 50 years, at which time the city could develop Hetch Hetchy if need be or, if they were fortunate, the need for the site would no longer exist due to development of other resources.  San Francisco and Phelan were initially against this plan but were not forced to voice any opposition thanks to the somewhat surprising response of John Muir.  He vociferously came out against the plan, railing against any foothold the city might get.  With no support for the plan, it quietly died.[59]

Garfield’s successor, Richard A. Ballinger re-reviewed the permit that had been granted by his predecessor.  Ballinger ordered San Francisco to show just cause in order to keep the permit.[60]  Before the permit could be revoked, a new secretary was appointed.  Walter Fisher echoed Secretary Hitchcock’s assertion that development rights should not necessarily be granted in a national park without further action by Congress.[61]  Fisher’s recommendation would not come to fruition before his own successor, Franklin K. Lane, took office.  Secretary Lane was the former attorney for the city and county of San Francisco.  Seizing on a chance to make headway, Lane brought the development issue before Congress and offered his own testimony.[62]  If Lane was to have any success, the city of San Francisco would need to answer and suppress its critics.

 

Curbing Opposition and a New Plan in Motion

            After the earthquake of 1906, the Spring Valley Water Company fell into disrepair.  Once one of the most outspoken opponents to the damming of the Tuolumne River, Spring Valley was virtually brought to ruin.  Its inability to deal with the catastrophic fires caused Spring Valley stock to plummet to only a few dollars per share.  Soon speculators purchased all available stock and sought to sell it to San Francisco at an enormous profit.[63]  The matter ended up in court and San Francisco eventually became the sole owner of the former Spring Valley Water Company.[64] 

            The Sierra Club and its founder, John Muir, remained a powerful obstacle to the development forces in San Francisco and thus they began an all out public relations campaign.  Muir’s writings tended to be somewhat poetic and had the noted impact of having a stronger appeal to women than men.  Women did not yet have the vote yet and so San Francisco attacked Muir by calling his masculinity into question.  By making him appear womanish they sought to alienate and drive a wedge between him and his male supporters.  He was also attacked by being painted as defending the rights of monopolistic companies such as the Spring Valley Water Company and Pacific Gas and Energy (PG & E).  These companies held a stranglehold on public utilities and it was made to seem that the only way common people could get out from under their grip was the development of Hetch Hetchy.[65] 

            Further eroding the power of the Sierra Club was the fact that the group was divided along geographical lines.  The club had been founded in California and thus a large base of its members resided there, including in San Francisco.  Men such as the city engineer, Marsden Manson, and the chief engineer for the Spring Valley Water Company, Herman Shussler, were members.  An obvious conflict of interest was at work and the club began to splinter between those in California who supported development and those farther away who were against it.  Things became so heated that Muir, in 1909, broke with the group and formed the Society for the Preservation of National Parks, a group solely committed to the preservation ethic.[66]

San Francisco began taking measures to assuage the concerns of neighboring irrigation districts.  The city agreed to recognize the prior rights of Modesto and Turlock so that both districts would be ensured their usual water flow capacity.[67]  The irrigation districts would also benefit from flood control which was one by-product of the dam.  No longer would they have to worry about the destruction of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property in the San Joaquin and Sacramento valleys.[68] With some of its critics silenced or otherwise satisfied, San Francisco began lobbying for federal support.  San Francisco sent hired lobbyists to Capitol Hill to work on behalf of the cause.[69]  The city also began buying out claims held by individual speculators in Hetch Hetchy.  The city spent $1.75 million buying out claims.  One purchase alone in 1909 of 720 acres cost the city $174,311.20.[70]

As an act of further unification, all cities in the Bay Area signed a petition in favor of development of Hetch Hetchy.  In 1910, the city of San Francisco approved a $45 million bond for the project.  After counting 30,000 votes, only 1200 were against it.[71]  Once Hetch Hetchy was able to be developed, the Bay area would be able to lower the level of its own water table and develop new local wells thus further ensuring the water supply.[72]

            It seemed that local opinion was shifting in favor of the Hetch Hetchy project.  San Francisco would still need to convince the federal government.  The city volunteered several lucrative incentives in attempts to do so.  San Francisco would agree to build and maintain new roads and telegraph lines through the park and would guarantee water for all military bases in the Bay Area.[73]  All lands in Yosemite and Stanislaus National Forest that were owned by the city would be transferred to the federal government.[74]  San Francisco also made efforts to win the approval of various cabinet members by adding language to a proposed bill that was desired by each.[75]

            Before long, Secretary of the Interior Lane was joined in his support of the dam by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of the U.S. Geological survey, the Chief Forester, the Board of Army Engineers, representatives from California at all levels of government, the engineer for the state of California, and the Public Lands Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives.[76]  It seemed the tide was slowly turning.  Representative Graham of Illinois remarked upon a growing sentiment, “it is true there are other places in the mountains where water could be had, but at a prohibitive cost.”[77]  The city of San Francisco began counting its money.

 

A Question of Cash

            As San Francisco realized that a project for building a dam was on the horizon, it began readying the city’s coffers to convince Congress of its commitment.  San Francisco would fully fund the project to the tune of $77 million from its own reserves.[78]  While the amount was exorbitant, it was still $20 million less than the cost of any comparable project.[79]  The city would also make available funds for the construction and maintenance of roads which would be handed over free of cost to the federal government after completion of the dam.[80]  San Francisco agreed to pay rent on the land used in Hetch Hetchy for a dam with all monies being transferred into a general fund for national parks.  The land would be without charge for the first 5 years, the cost would go up to $15,000 annually for 10 years.  For the next decade, the city would pay $20,000 annually.  The cost would eventually settle on a fixed $30,000 payment yearly for the life of the grant.[81] San Francisco would develop 60,000 horsepower of hydro-electricity which would remain under the city’s control.[82]  Up to this point, the city did not have ownership of its own water or power systems.  It would not be allowed to sell the power to a private corporation and would be responsible for supplying power to the neighboring regions.  San Francisco would be given the right to use all construction materials on the public land such as stone, earth, gravel, and sand for free in order to build the dam.[83]  The stage was set for a dam to be built, but Congress had yet to grant its approval.

 

The Raker Act

            Congress met to discuss the issue of damming the Tuolumne River for the use of San Francisco in 1913.  Party power had shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats leaving a pro-development force in control of Congress.  They held an emergency session without public notice.  Representative Raker from California made the water famine problem one of the main topics for debate.  He introduced a bill to construct a dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley.  Even if Congress were to approve the project, the dam would not be completed until 1923 and effects of the water famine would continue to be felt.[84] 

One of the main supporters of development to testify before Congress was Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot.  He made remarks before the Pubic Lands Committee on June 25, 1913.  Pinchot summed up his opinion by stating that “the fundamental principle of the whole conservation policy is that of use-to take every part of the land and its resources and put it to that use which it will best serve the most people.”[85]  This was one central argument for putting the land to use by adopting a model of conservation.  Preservationists such as Muir and Johnson vehemently opposed this line of reasoning and battled vigorously to secure the land from development.  They, along with various members of the Sierra Club, testified before Congress, published pamphlets, brochures and newspaper articles to sway public opinion and even hired lawyers to lay the groundwork of preventing what they viewed as a gross misuse of nature.

Congress heard several other key issues during testimony.  The construction of roads and trails that would accompany the project would aid in fire-fighting efforts in the forest reserves and would facilitate the tourism industry.[86]  Raker pledged that the city and county of San Francisco would be required to maintain all roads “until the crack of doom.”[87]  San Francisco would also effectively be responsible for funding irrigation in the area, a project on which the federal government had already spent $60 million.[88]  The dam could be viewed as one of the highest forms of conservation.  An estimated 200 million gallons per day of destructive flood waters would be converted for use for drinking, bathing, and other domestic purposes rather than wasted by letting it flow to the sea.[89]  In direct contrast to statements made by naturalists such as John Muir, the natural beauty of the valley would be “enhanced rather than diminished-a beautiful lake will beautify the land, no park is complete without a water feature” after all.[90]  After hearing all sides of the debate, Congress would pass the Raker Act of 1913 and approve the damming of the Tuolumne River.

 

San Francisco’s Burden

            It would seem that San Francisco had ultimately won the fight, but the victory did not come without strict stipulations upon the city.  The Raker Act ordered the city not to “take, cut or destroy timber within the Yosemite National Park or Stanislaus National Forest except such as may be actually necessary in order to construct, repair and operate it.”[91]  The city would also be made to pay to the federal government the full value of any timber that was cut, injured, or destroyed.[92]  The act further specified that rights would not include land “upon which homestead, mining, or other existing valid claim or claims shall have been filed or made.”[93]  San Francisco would be required to purchase all necessary lands that it did not already own.  Any lasting structures built in conjunction with the project were to be “of suitable exterior design and finish so as to harmonize with the surrounding landscape and its use as a park.”[94]  Finally, San Francisco was strictly prohibited from selling or subletting the land and the electric energy produced on it to a third party.[95]

 

Aftermath:  Can San Francisco Live up to the Bargain?

            Construction began on the dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley in 1919.[96]  Lake Eleanor and the Cherry Creek sites were developed first and Hetch Hetchy was to follow.  The dam itself, later named O’Shaughnessy, was completed in 1923.  By 1934, San Francisco was generating revenue of $2 million per year from the sale of hydro-electric power.  In fact, the city had already recovered 20 percent of the funds spent on the project.[97]  A grant of $3.5 million was also secured from the Public Works Administration to expand the dam by 85.5 feet.[98]

            Those expecting San Francisco to renege on its full responsibilities would not have to wait for long.  The city directly violated the provision that no power gained from the dam would be sold to a third party.  In 1925, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company purchased rights to all hydro-electric power generated by the dam.  San Francisco tried to justify the action by claiming no sale was actually made.  Instead, the power was distributed to private consumers with Pacific Gas acting as an agent of the city.[99]  The Department of the Interior brought a suit against the city of San Francisco.  This case would reach the Supreme Court in 1940 in United States v. City and County of San Francisco and the Court ruled that the Raker Act had indeed been violated.[100]  San Francisco would have to re-assume responsibility for distributing all power.

            San Francisco also attempted to shirk its duty to build and maintain roads throughout the park.  The director of the National Park Service, Stephen Mather, demanded that the city fulfill its obligations.  There was a long dispute over what types of roads were actually to be built.  San Francisco maintained that no further roads were needed.  Under Mather’s supervision, the city was compelled to complete a motor highway costing $300,000.  To avoid endless expenses over roads, San Francisco would eventually pay a flat fee of $1.25 million which waived all future responsibilities of the city to provide and maintain a road network through the park.[101] 

            More disturbing was the fact that San Francisco miss-appropriated over $1 billion dollars of revenue from the sale of hydro-electric power.  While revenue brought in by the dam should have been used to cover its upkeep, most of the funds went to other unrelated projects.[102]  Critics would decry this misuse of public funds and would point out the blatant abuse of power. 

 

Hetch Hetchy Today

Hetch Hetchy as a water system for the city was an unqualified success.  It provided a surplus of badly needed water that was both fresh and pure as well as being extremely reliable.  The existence of this source of fresh water allowed San Francisco to grow and become the “imperial city” of James Phelan’s dreams, coming to dominate commerce and the economies of the cities around it, even surpassing early estimates of its potential.  An early report on the necessity of developing Hetch Hetchy listed as one of its primary factors that the population of the San Francisco Bay Area would reach 3.2 million by the year 2000 and that Hetch Hetchy could provide enough water to support that population on its own.  As of today the Hetch Hetchy system provides enough water for 2.4 million people out of a total of 7.2 million residents, just over a third of the population.  If anything, the need for a water source was actually underestimated.[103]   

To this day, preservationists and various legislators continue to struggle to return Hetch Hetchy to a pristine state.  In the eyes of some people, what was once a great symbol of American ingenuity and technical prowess has become one of our most offensive environmental blunders.[104]  Most environmental interest groups, including the National Park Service, view the dam as a giant scab on the local ecosystem and dream of its removal.[105]  The Sierra Club, Restore Hetch Hetchy, and the Environmental Defense group have all supported restoration of the valley.  In 1987, Secretary Hodel formally proposed restoration, and a study conducted the following year concluded it was feasible and further research should be pursued.[106]  As late as 2004, a plan by the Environmental Defense group was formulated for removal of the dam.  Their study, titled “Paradise Regained: Solutions for Restoring Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy Valley,” determined that the dam could be removed as alternative water sources were available and sufficient to meet current and future demands.[107]  The study went on to state that the loss of hydro-power could be compensated for without contributing to air pollution or global warming.  Furthermore, it would cost between $1-2 billion to fund the restoration project and would take a century for the valley to be completely repaired.[108]  By the end of 2004, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Secretary of Resources directed state agencies to undergo their own study of costs and benefits associated with the restoration of the valley.[109]

The dam itself and the overall water system have suffered their own problems.  In 2002, multiple leaks and maintenance problems were discovered.  For twenty years, San Francisco officials had been raiding millions of dollars generated from the sale of the dam’s hydro-power.  These funds were meant for the upkeep of the water system but were instead directed to other projects in order to cover shortfalls in the city budget.  Ultimately, the Bay area’s largest water supply was left vulnerable to disrepair, earthquakes, drought, and decay due to insufficient funding.[110]  Since 1979 when the first records were available, over $678 million have been transferred from the dam to other projects.  To this day, San Francisco still pays only $30,000 a year for water rights.  Proposals to increase this fee so that it more closely resembles current market value have been fought by California.  At current market value, water rights would cost $8 million a year.[111]

                                                         

A New National Outlook

            The events that shaped the Hetch Hetchy Valley have had a nationwide impact on the importance of conservation.  The modern environmental movement was conceived during the fight over the valley.  The end result of the campaign proved to the Sierra Club that greater coordination was needed in order to preserve the wilderness.  The Sierra Club became more influential in both advisory and policy-making roles when decisions regarding the use of lands in the public domain arose.  They worked to establish organization and initiatives at both the national and local levels of government.[112]  The first director of the National Park Service, Stephen T. Mather, was a Sierra Club member and often employed the Club’s advice and ideologies throughout his service.[113]

            Aside from greater activism on the part of environmental groups, the loss of Hetch Hetchy awakened the nation in defense of its national parks.  The tide of public opinion shifted toward a desire to preserve the great outdoors and the nation’s unique open spaces.  Dams that were planned for Dinosaur National Monument, Glacier National Park, and Grand Canyon National Park were prevented.[114]  A project in the 1940s that would construct ten dams and cost a billion dollars on the Colorado River for the purposes of flood control, irrigation, recreation, and hydro-power was halted.[115]  Logging of firs was opposed in Olympic National Park, and Los Angeles was not allowed access to water in Kings Canyon.[116]  More recently, attempted drilling in the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge led to such severe public protest that the action was dropped. 

As challenges to the environment occur, the Sierra Club and other organizations have become better funded, better organized, and thoroughly professional thanks in large part due to public support.[117]  Both the public and Congress are more comfortable with the concept of wilderness and the value of preservation.  Congress would eventually approve a Colorado River storage project in 1956 with the caveat that “no dam or reservoir constructed under authorization of the act shall be within any national park or monument.”[118]

            As of today, the National Wilderness Preservation System contains 105 million acres which constitutes 4.67% of the nation’s total land area.  There are 662 tracts of land protected in 44 different states.  Alaska alone contains 54% of that acreage.  No other nation on Earth has set aside anywhere near this amount of land to be held as wilderness in perpetuity.[119]  Developers must now bear the burden of proof as to why it is necessary to invade wilderness in order to expand.[120]  Failure to provide sufficient reasoning could lead to sustained public outcry.

            The environmentalists lost their battle over the Hetch Hetchy Valley, but inadvertently made great gains that would not be erased.  The eyes of the American public were opened to the importance of preservation and to how essential our park system is to our national character.  As a nation, we will always strive for progress.  Expansion is inevitable as development is the nature of civilization.  However, the mark of the truly civilized is the ability to preserve that which is beautiful and precious for its own sake.  We must always struggle to keep that fine balance between innovation and encroachment. 

 

 

Citations


 

[1] Holway Jones, John Muir and the Sierra Club: The Battle for Yosemite [San Francisco: The Sierra Club, 1965], XI.

[2] Ibid

[3] John Muir, American Society in the 20th Century: Selected Readings, ed. Dwight W. Hoover and C. Warren Vander Hill  [Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 1972], 173.

[4] Ibid, 175.

[5] Ibid  

[6] Ibid, 176.

[7] Ibid, 177.

[8] Frederick Schwarz,  “Hetch Hetchy Transfer,”  New York Times, January 5, 1910,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=7&did=104915889&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189898739&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].  

[9] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3972.

[10] Ibid, 3899.

[11] Bay Area Census. “Population by county, 1860-2000.” Metropolitan Transportation Commission. http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/historical/copop18602000.htm [accessed September 29, 2007].

[12] John Warfield Simpson, Dam!: Water; Power; Politics, and Preservation in Hetch Hetchy and Yosemite National Park [New York: Pantheon Books, 2005], 36.

[13] Robert W. Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy: American’s Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 35.

[14] Ibid, 36.

[15] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3902.

[16] Ibid, 3897.

[17] Ibid, 3894.

[18] Ibid, 3905.

[19] Robert W. Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy: American’s Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 37.

[20] John Warfield Simpson, Dam!: Water; Power; Politics, and Preservation in Hetch Hetchy and Yosemite National Park [New York: Pantheon Books, 2005], 102.

[21] Ibid

[22] Editorial, “Army Board Favors $77,000,000 Project,”  New York Times, February 23, 1913,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=12&did=100255640&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189900149&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[23] John Warfield Simpson, Dam!: Water; Power; Politics, and Preservation in Hetch Hetchy and Yosemite National Park [New York: Pantheon Books, 2005], 104.

[24] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3903.

[25] Ibid, 3914.

[26] T.T. Williams, “Hetch-Hetchy Fight Due to Water Trust,”  New York Times, January 2, 1910,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=5&did=105072259&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189898739&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[27] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3903.

[28] Ibid, 3902.

[29] Ibid

[30] Editorial, “Army Board Favors $77,000,000 Project,”  New York Times, February 23, 1913,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=12&did=100255640&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189900149&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[31] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3899.

[32] Ibid, 3894.

[33] U.S. Congress. House.  Hetch-Hetchy Reservoir Site Act.  HR 7207.  63rd Cong., 1st sess., [September 3, 1913].,  http://www.sfmuseum.org/hetch/hetchy10.html [accessed September 20, 2007].
[34] Frederick Schwarz,  “Hetch Hetchy Transfer,”  New York Times, January 5, 1910,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=7&did=104915889&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189898739&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].  

[35] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3898.

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid, 3899.

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Editorial, “A Future Paradise for Mankind in South America,”  New York Times, April 21, 1912,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?RQT=309&VInst=PROD&VName=HNP&VType=PQD&pv=1&sid=1&index=11&SrchMode=1&Fmt=10&did=100583136 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[41] Ibid

[42] Harriet Monroe,  “Shall the Hetch-Hetchy Valley Be Saved for the Nation?,”  Chicago Daily Tribune, March 27, 1910,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?RQT=309&VInst=PROD&VName=HNP&VType=PQD&pv=1&sid=1&index=2&SrchMode=1&Fmt=10&did=387275501 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[43] Special to the New York Times,  “Oppose Reservoir in Yosemite Park,”  New York Times, December 21, 1908,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),” http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=2&did=105016584&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189898739&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[44] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3899.

[45] U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on Public Lands.  Decision of the Secretary of the Interior Department… in the Yosemite National Park.  60th Cong., 2nd sess., December 16, 1908.  http://www.sfmuseum.org/hetch/hetchy2.html [accessed September 20, 2007]. 

[46] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3898.

[47] Ibid, 3916.

[48] Robert W. Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy: American’s Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 36.

[49] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3905.

[50] Ibid

[51] U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on Public Lands.  Petition of Marsden Manson, City Engineer of San Francisco, … in the Yosemite National Park.  60th Cong., 2nd sess., December 16, 1908.  http://www.sfmuseum.org/hetch/hetchy2.html [accessed September 20, 2007]. 

[52] John Warfield Simpson, Dam!: Water; Power; Politics, and Preservation in Hetch Hetchy and Yosemite National Park [New York: Pantheon Books, 2005], 126.

[53] U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on Public Lands.  Decision of the Secretary of the Interior Department… in the Yosemite National Park.  60th Cong., 2nd sess., December 16, 1908.  http://www.sfmuseum.org/hetch/hetchy2.html [accessed September 20, 2007].

[54] Earthquake Hazards Program.  “The Great 1906 San Francisco Earthquake.”  U.S. Geological Survey.  http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/nca/1906/18april/index.php [accessed September 29, 2007].

[55] T.T. Williams, “Hetch-Hetchy Fight Due to Water Trust,”  New York Times, January 2, 1910,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),”  http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=5&did=105072259&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189898739&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[56] Cong. Rec.,  63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, 50, pt. 4: 3905.

[57] Special to the New York Times,  “Oppose Reservoir in Yosemite Park,”  New York Times, December 21, 1908,  Under “ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004),” http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/pqdweb?index=2&did=105016584&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=HNP&TS=1189898739&clientId=8224 [accessed September 15, 2007].

[58] U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on Public Lands.  Decision of the Secretary of the Interior Department… in the Yosemite National Park.  60th Cong., 2nd sess., December 16, 1908.  http://www.sfmuseum.org/hetch/hetchy2.html [accessed September 20,